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The theory of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has 
significantly influenced the doctrine and future planning of 
the United States military, but has perhaps been most influ-
ential in the minds of the United States Air Force. Exempli-
fying this line of thought is the conception and production 
of the United States’ next multi-role fighter aircraft – the F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter. Unlike the F-22 Raptor (which can per-
form maneuvers no human pilot can survive), the F-35 is not 
a significant leap forward in pure aerial performance; rather, 
the F-35 possesses significant advances in areas such as com-
munications and networking capability. The F-35 is designed 
from the ground up with the ideas of the RMA in mind, and 
its effectiveness (or lack thereof) will ultimately be a judg-
ment on RMA theory.
Discussion of the RMA and the role of air power must first 
address the nature of the theory itself. The fundamental un-
derpinning of RMA theory is the idea of “strategic paralysis”- 
the ideal state in which one can achieve victory on the bat-
tlefield without a strategy of attrition or annihilation. Rather, 
a commander seeks to strike at an enemy’s centers of gravity 
in order to slow the decision making process until  theiruntil 
their decisions become ineffective and they lose the will to 
resist. Much of this theory is rooted in the work of John Boyd 
and John Warden, particularly John Boyd’s OODA loop. 
Developed initially as an understanding of dogfighting, the 
OODA loops breaks down decision making into four steps – 
observe, orient, decide, act. When dogfighting, the pilot who 
is able to make decisions quicker is able to seize render his 
opponent’s decisions ineffective and seize a decisive advan-
tage. The theory of strategic paralysis scales up these ideas 
from a single engagement to an entire conflict; by attacking 
command and control centers and other strategic points one 
can reduce or eliminate the enemy’s ability to make timely 
and therefore effective decisions, eventually resulting in the 
loss of the will to fight and capitulation.
This theory is especially attractive to airpower theorists, as 
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airpower plays a crucial role; it is by far the most efficient way 
in which to strike at enemy centers of gravity. In fact, the ad-
vent of precision guidedprecision-guided munitions is one of 
the crucial technological developments credited with enabling 
this type of warfighting. Gulf Wars I and II are often cited as 
primary examples of the power of this type of warfare – in 
both conflicts (but especially Gulf War II) precision guided 
munitions and strikes at Iraqi centers of gravity severed lines 
of communication and supply, and rendered most of the Iraqi 
army strategically ineffectual. The result appeared to be a re-
sounding success for strategic paralysis as a method of waging 
war As military planners envisioned future war, strategic pa-
ralysis played a central role, and  thus significantly informed 
the design and development of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 
The F-35 is from the ground up designed to operate in a capac-
ity consistent with the tenets of RMA theory. In fact, the F-35 
is even billed as the “first complete OODA loop aircraft;” ad-
vanced sensors greatly enhance observation, automatic target 
tracking eases orientation, sensor fusion aids in decision mak-
ing, and the ease of control allows the pilot to focus 
on acting. F-35s are heavily networked, and tap in to 
not only their own advanced sensors but also those of 
other F-35s and the entire in-theater sensor and com-
munications network. In this way, the F-35 attempts 
to tighten the OODA loops of both individual pilots 
and the force as a whole and gain a significant decision 
making advantage versus the enemy. 
While the F-35 possesses some of the most advanced 
computer systems ever placed in a fighter aircraft, 
compromises in the design could pose problems in 
terms of performance vis a vis peer competitor craft. 
While the exact performance standards and technol-
ogy present in the Russian T-50 and Chinese J-31 are 
unknown, it is speculated that both could potentially 
outperform the F-35, mainly due to the constraints the 
STOVL (Short Takeoff Vertical Landing) capability of 
the F-35B put on the design and construction of the 
airframe. The F-35’s STOVL capabilities necessitated a 
bulkier and lower performing fuselage and the lift fan blocks 
rear vision from the cockpit. The removal of some parts to save 
weight increased the vulnerability of the aircraft to enemy fire 
by 25%. Reductions to the F-22 program mean that the F-35 
will be expected to shoulder a much greater share of air-to-air 
combat responsibilities going forward. This could prove prob-
lematic if the next-generation fighters of the United States’ po-
tential rivals significantly outclass the F-35. Some simulations, 
including one in 2008 by the RAND Corporation, suggest that 
the F-35 will be wholly outclassed in air to air combat by en-
emy aircraft; in one simulated exercise pitting the F-35 ver-
sus Russian Sukhoi aircraft (presumably their next generation 
fighters), the F-35s were “clubbed like baby seals.”
However, constructing next generation fighter aircraft is no 
simple task, and it is certainly possible the other countries 
next-gen fighters are saddled with their own share of issues. 
In fact the Indian Air Force has had significant complaints 
about the performance of the T-50’s engine, radar, and poor 
construction. Much more secrecy surrounds the T-50 and J-31 
than the F-35 due to the nature of the societies in which they 
are produced - it is possible that they are significantly less ca-
pable than Western defense planners project. Building stealth 
aircraft requires significant engineering capability and manu-
facturing processes with virtually no margin for error, capabil-
ities the Russian and Chinese defense industries may currently 
lack. However, it is far from prudent to base defense planning 
on assumptions about lack of capability from rivals, and next 
generation stealth aircraft are certainly no exception.
Ultimately, the F-35 is not a major step forward in aircraft 
performance – many test pilots and projections place it as 
roughly equal in that regard to the  F/A-18 Super Hornet, an 
aircraft dating to 1995. The true advances present in the F-35 
are the advanced stealth, avionics, and communication tech-
nologies; all of which play important roles in tightening one’s 
own OODA loop while disrupting the enemy’s. While the 
F-35 may struggle to out-climb or out-maneuver Russian or 
Chinese fighters, it is hoped that it will not have to – rather, its 
advanced stealth and information gathering capabilities will 
give it a decisive advantage over enemy aircraft. Thus, whether 
the historical record will judge the F-35 as a failure or success 
will ultimately hinge on whether a revolution in military af-
fairs has truly occurred.
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